PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
SHOWS
HOW MOVING FROM THE POLITICAL CENTRE WINS VOTES
John Redwood stated in a posting on his blog diary (johnredwoodsdiary.com) on 25th November that UKIP ‘By showing how little support its cause has, it fails to bully the Conservative leadership, who see most of the extra votes they need to win a General Election in the poll findings of the Greens, the LibDems and Labour’. This seems to be an accurate statement of where the Conservative leadership is directing its search for votes.
The Conservative leadership is still pursuing its 20-20 strategy based on the idea that elections are decided by small movements among the 20 per cent of marginal voters in the 20 per cent of marginal constituencies. Thus about four per cent of the actual voting electorate, or about one million voters, determine the result of elections.
In fact, public choice theory predict that in a multi-party system, the party that moves away from the central consensus will make net vote gains.
The seminal work on public choice by Professor Gordon Tullock, The Vote Motive, originally published in 1976 by the Institute of Economic Affairs, contains an interesting section on the different ways political parties should position themselves to win votes in a two-party system and in a multi-party system.
Gordon Tullock points out that ‘in a two-party system there is a simple operational rule for the politicians: find out what the other party is doing and take a position very close to it in the popular direction’.
This is based on the ‘so-called median voter’ theorem.
"If the parties would rather be elected than beaten, and they choose their policies accordingly, they would attempt to take the position of the median voter, because that assures them of success against any other policy taken by the other party. In practice, of course, we observe that in most two-party democracies the parties are very close together and near the dead centre of opinion."
This, as Tullock points out, does not prohibit politicians occasionally making a mistake and, on some occasions, adopting policies far away from the median vote.
This median voter theorem roughly describes the way policies worked in the pre-1970 British system.
One should make two points. Gordon Tullock admits that both parties can veer away from “the popular direction”. Since about 1970 the political class has veered further and further away from ‘the popular direction’ in many policy areas, such as EU membership, mass third world immigration, overseas wars, climate change hysteria, crime, etc., while remaining close to ‘the popular direction’ in such areas as the NHS, the mixed economy, etc.
The second point in British politics is that since the 1980s Britain has had a three-party or two and a half party system. However, the Alliance and later the LibDems did not in fact move far away from the other parties and acted more as a liberal wing of the Labour Party, from where many of them indeed originated.
Professor Tullock then considers a three or more party system where the parties are credible and have distinctive policies and by geometric analysis shows how everything changes under such a system. Instead of clustering together, parties move away from the close togetherness of the two old parties:
"The party which moved away from the middle lost votes in the centre of the (statistical voting) distribution, but pushed up votes around the edge and the net result of this move was a gain."
"Thus one anticipates that the parties in a two-party system would be very close together but that there would be considerable differences between them in a three (or more) party system.’’
"A three (or more) party system requires a good deal more skill on the part of the party leaders and mistakes are much easier to make."
The change introduced by the arrival of more parties is amplified if the issues which are salient now are different from issues which were salient in the past and if the old parties cluster far away from ‘the popular direction’ in these new issues. A new party can make less headway where the old parties stick close to the centre of opinion, for example, on the old issues of the NHS or the mixed economy. It is likely to prosper a great deal if the old parties have a consensus a long way from ‘the popular direction’ on new salient issues, such as on the EU or mass third world immigration or climate change.
The results of recent Euro-elections demonstrate that the Gordon Tullock analysis is correct with the total Labour/Conservative combined vote down to the mid 40s.
So the model offered by the Conservative Party, which is a pre-1970 political model, is wrong. The Conservatives are not likely to gain many votes from Labour, LibDems or Greens unless these parties make errors which Labour clearly is doing but the LibDems and Greens are not. Positioning themselves always in relation to Labour means that the Conservatives are effectively confining themselves to battling Labour over the 67.6 per cent of the vote the two parties won in 2005 and ignoring the other 32.4 per cent of the voters.
Present polls indicate the combined Labour/Conservative share of the vote is projected to fall even below the low set in 2005. Positioning themselves fractionally nearer the ‘popular direction’ on issues which are salient now, such as the EU, immigration, climate change or parliamentary expenses’ reform, will not do the Tories much good in a multi-party system.
There are new parties roaming the edge of the (statistical voting) distribution. To win back voters from such parties, the old parties are forced away from the centre, and especially from a consensus on issues where they have taken up collusive stances on issues and where these stances are not at the centre point of public opinion.
"Within a three-party system, nothing so simple (as being close to your opponent but in the popular direction) exists. Difficult decisions must be made and frequent errors are to be expected."
What may save the Conservatives is that Britain does not have a proportional representation which, as Tullock said, especially reveals the effects of public choice theory. In proportional representation systems, such as used in the EU parliament, every vote counts. In first-past-the-post electoral systems each constituency only produces one elected member as opposed to several members as in Euro elections. At present there are few constituencies where there is a realistic chance of any of three or more competing parties electing that member (that is, three-way or four-way marginals). Therefore, seats can be won in the old way with a lower and lower plurality of voters with the voters on the edge of the distribution being ignored. It is, however, a very risky strategy which gives even more weight to tiny movements of voters between the major parties and especially to the differential rate at which voters abandon the two old parties. It also excludes an increasing number of the electorate and weakens the mandate.
Looking further ahead, on current trends the sort of dynamic which reduced the combined Labour/Tory vote to the mid-40 percentage in the 2009 euro elections will continue so that in the next euro elections the Labour Party and the Tories will be reduced to supplying two of six parties all with shares of the vote of the same magnitude. The possibility is that UKIP could become the largest party in the next euro elections.
If the Cameron government goes off the rails, this dynamic will spread into first-past-the-post Westminster elections with more four or five party marginals and minor parties actually electing Westminster MPs. This effect, however, is likely to be a much slower phenomenon.
Moving away from the central consensus may lose a small number of votes in the centre but, as Gordon Tullock shows, such a move "gains votes around the edge" which is now a vote-rich area.
FUTURUS/29 December 2009
John Redwood stated in a posting on his blog diary (johnredwoodsdiary.com) on 25th November that UKIP ‘By showing how little support its cause has, it fails to bully the Conservative leadership, who see most of the extra votes they need to win a General Election in the poll findings of the Greens, the LibDems and Labour’. This seems to be an accurate statement of where the Conservative leadership is directing its search for votes.
The Conservative leadership is still pursuing its 20-20 strategy based on the idea that elections are decided by small movements among the 20 per cent of marginal voters in the 20 per cent of marginal constituencies. Thus about four per cent of the actual voting electorate, or about one million voters, determine the result of elections.
In fact, public choice theory predict that in a multi-party system, the party that moves away from the central consensus will make net vote gains.
The seminal work on public choice by Professor Gordon Tullock, The Vote Motive, originally published in 1976 by the Institute of Economic Affairs, contains an interesting section on the different ways political parties should position themselves to win votes in a two-party system and in a multi-party system.
Gordon Tullock points out that ‘in a two-party system there is a simple operational rule for the politicians: find out what the other party is doing and take a position very close to it in the popular direction’.
This is based on the ‘so-called median voter’ theorem.
"If the parties would rather be elected than beaten, and they choose their policies accordingly, they would attempt to take the position of the median voter, because that assures them of success against any other policy taken by the other party. In practice, of course, we observe that in most two-party democracies the parties are very close together and near the dead centre of opinion."
This, as Tullock points out, does not prohibit politicians occasionally making a mistake and, on some occasions, adopting policies far away from the median vote.
This median voter theorem roughly describes the way policies worked in the pre-1970 British system.
One should make two points. Gordon Tullock admits that both parties can veer away from “the popular direction”. Since about 1970 the political class has veered further and further away from ‘the popular direction’ in many policy areas, such as EU membership, mass third world immigration, overseas wars, climate change hysteria, crime, etc., while remaining close to ‘the popular direction’ in such areas as the NHS, the mixed economy, etc.
The second point in British politics is that since the 1980s Britain has had a three-party or two and a half party system. However, the Alliance and later the LibDems did not in fact move far away from the other parties and acted more as a liberal wing of the Labour Party, from where many of them indeed originated.
Professor Tullock then considers a three or more party system where the parties are credible and have distinctive policies and by geometric analysis shows how everything changes under such a system. Instead of clustering together, parties move away from the close togetherness of the two old parties:
"The party which moved away from the middle lost votes in the centre of the (statistical voting) distribution, but pushed up votes around the edge and the net result of this move was a gain."
"Thus one anticipates that the parties in a two-party system would be very close together but that there would be considerable differences between them in a three (or more) party system.’’
"A three (or more) party system requires a good deal more skill on the part of the party leaders and mistakes are much easier to make."
The change introduced by the arrival of more parties is amplified if the issues which are salient now are different from issues which were salient in the past and if the old parties cluster far away from ‘the popular direction’ in these new issues. A new party can make less headway where the old parties stick close to the centre of opinion, for example, on the old issues of the NHS or the mixed economy. It is likely to prosper a great deal if the old parties have a consensus a long way from ‘the popular direction’ on new salient issues, such as on the EU or mass third world immigration or climate change.
The results of recent Euro-elections demonstrate that the Gordon Tullock analysis is correct with the total Labour/Conservative combined vote down to the mid 40s.
So the model offered by the Conservative Party, which is a pre-1970 political model, is wrong. The Conservatives are not likely to gain many votes from Labour, LibDems or Greens unless these parties make errors which Labour clearly is doing but the LibDems and Greens are not. Positioning themselves always in relation to Labour means that the Conservatives are effectively confining themselves to battling Labour over the 67.6 per cent of the vote the two parties won in 2005 and ignoring the other 32.4 per cent of the voters.
Present polls indicate the combined Labour/Conservative share of the vote is projected to fall even below the low set in 2005. Positioning themselves fractionally nearer the ‘popular direction’ on issues which are salient now, such as the EU, immigration, climate change or parliamentary expenses’ reform, will not do the Tories much good in a multi-party system.
There are new parties roaming the edge of the (statistical voting) distribution. To win back voters from such parties, the old parties are forced away from the centre, and especially from a consensus on issues where they have taken up collusive stances on issues and where these stances are not at the centre point of public opinion.
"Within a three-party system, nothing so simple (as being close to your opponent but in the popular direction) exists. Difficult decisions must be made and frequent errors are to be expected."
What may save the Conservatives is that Britain does not have a proportional representation which, as Tullock said, especially reveals the effects of public choice theory. In proportional representation systems, such as used in the EU parliament, every vote counts. In first-past-the-post electoral systems each constituency only produces one elected member as opposed to several members as in Euro elections. At present there are few constituencies where there is a realistic chance of any of three or more competing parties electing that member (that is, three-way or four-way marginals). Therefore, seats can be won in the old way with a lower and lower plurality of voters with the voters on the edge of the distribution being ignored. It is, however, a very risky strategy which gives even more weight to tiny movements of voters between the major parties and especially to the differential rate at which voters abandon the two old parties. It also excludes an increasing number of the electorate and weakens the mandate.
Looking further ahead, on current trends the sort of dynamic which reduced the combined Labour/Tory vote to the mid-40 percentage in the 2009 euro elections will continue so that in the next euro elections the Labour Party and the Tories will be reduced to supplying two of six parties all with shares of the vote of the same magnitude. The possibility is that UKIP could become the largest party in the next euro elections.
If the Cameron government goes off the rails, this dynamic will spread into first-past-the-post Westminster elections with more four or five party marginals and minor parties actually electing Westminster MPs. This effect, however, is likely to be a much slower phenomenon.
Moving away from the central consensus may lose a small number of votes in the centre but, as Gordon Tullock shows, such a move "gains votes around the edge" which is now a vote-rich area.
FUTURUS/29 December 2009